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A STORY OF A BIRTH AND A FUNERAL: 
A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF WINDSOR AND 
SHELBY COUNTY 
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In 2013, the Supreme Court decided two major cases—United 
States v. Windsor and Shelby County v. Holder. The Court’s 
rulings prompted inquiries and criticisms regarding how the Court 
could simultaneously signal the birth of marriage equality and 
mark the end of racial equality. This Article compares these two 
cases by introducing another dimension that may make them more 
harmonious than they appear. In particular, it focuses on the 
Court’s narrative framework in each case and conducts a 
rhetorical analysis to analyze these narrative frameworks. It 
argues that the Court employs a personal narrative in Windsor 
and an institutional narrative in Shelby County, yet it 
conceptualizes and focuses on a “right” in each case. 
Additionally, the Court’s use of a personal narrative in Windsor 
and an institutional narrative in Shelby County increases the 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The summer of 2013 was a critical time for the Supreme Court 
of the United States. During that time, the Court decided two major 
cases: United States v. Windsor1 and Shelby County v. Holder.2 Its 
rulings in these cases perplexed many civil rights activists and 
legal scholars because the decisions seemed at odds on the issue of 
equality: many viewed Windsor as a step forward in achieving 
marriage equality 3  and Shelby County as a retreat in racial 
equality. 4  Questions arose as to the Court’s apparent 
inconsistency. 5  Some scholars analyzed these questions in the 
context of social movements. Is the LGBT movement a new racial 
movement?6 Are we living in the world of post-racialism?7 Do we 
                                                
1 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013). 
2 Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013). 
3 See, e.g., John D. Inazu, More Is More: Strengthening Free Exercise, 
Speech, and Association, 99 MINN. L. REV. 485 (2014); Douglas NeJaime, 
Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219, 221–23 (2013), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/2013/9/15/nejaime.html.  
4 See, e.g., Atiba R. Ellis, Shelby Co. v. Holder:  The Crippling of the 
Voting Rights Act, AM. CONSTITUTION SOCIETY BLOG (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/shelby-co-v-holder-the-crippling-of-the-voting-
rights-act (stating that “relying on the myth of racial progress, the Supreme 
Court failed to confront the racial balkanization in voting that exists”); Tanya 
Hernandez, A Watered-Down Vision of Equality, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/06/26/is-the-civil-rights-era-
over/a-watered-down-vision-of-equality (“One can celebrate the victories for 
gay people . . . while at the same time decrying the decisions’ limited vision of 
equality. That limited vision eroded the pursuit of equality in this term’s racial 
justice cases.”).    
5 See, e.g., Enumale Agada & Aaron Blacksberg, A Tale of Two Cases: 
Shelby County v. Holder and United States v. Windsor, HARV. AM. 
CONSTITUTION SOC’Y (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www3.law.harvard.edu/ 
orgs/acs/2013/11/02/a-tale-of-two-cases-shelby-county-v-holder-and-united-
states-v-windsor/ (describing a talk by Professor Pam Karlan, wherein she 
compared the two cases).  
6 See, e.g., Paul Butler, The Court Should Focus on Justice Rather 
Than Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
roomfordebate/2013/06/26/is-the-civil-rights-era-over/the-court-should-focus-
on-justice-rather-than-rights.  
7 See, e.g., Atiba R. Ellis, Mission Accomplished? Post-Racialism in Shelby 
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no longer feel the need to focus on racial equality but feel the 
stronger need to address marriage inequality?  The focal point of 
these inquiries was the inconsistent outcomes of these two cases: 
one that signaled an advance of civil rights while the other signaled 
a retreat.  
This Article attempts to shift the focus from the outcome of the 
cases to the processes by which they were decided: it analyzes how 
they were decided rather than what the outcomes were. It argues 
that by analyzing the content of the decisions, one might find them  
more harmonious than what their starkly different outcomes might 
suggest. It further argues that this mode of analysis reveals two 
similarities that are not easily apparent from looking at the 
outcomes. First, both cases evoke a similar rhetoric regarding the 
concept of rights. While one case is a discussion of individual 
rights and the other of institutional rights, the Court engages in an 
extensive discussion of the particular right in each case. The 
rhetoric suggests that the Court is not necessarily pro-right in 
Windsor and anti-right in Shelby County. Instead, it suggests that 
the Court conceptualizes the subject of rights differently in each 
case: rights of individuals in Windsor and rights of institutions, like 
states, in Shelby County. Second, to advance these 
conceptualizations of rights, the Court in both cases uses rhetorical 
devices that make the outcomes more persuasive.  
In describing how the Court convincingly conceptualizes rights 
in both cases, this Article uses the terms personal narrative and 
institutional narrative. As used in this Article, personal narrative is 
storytelling that focuses on developing personal characters and 
triggering emotional attachment to those characters and their 
stories. In contrast, institutional narrative focuses on reducing this 
personal connection between individual characters and the reader. 
An institutional narrative seeks to gain legitimacy and 
persuasiveness by focusing on an institution, such as the federal 
government, including its traditions and principles. This Article 
explores the effects of the Court’s framing of these two 
                                                
County, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y BLOG (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.acslaw. 
org/acsblog/mission-accomplished-post-racialism-and-shelby-county for post-
racialism discussion.  
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narratives—it does not express a normative argument for either 
one.  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the 
conventional reception of Windsor and Shelby County. It explores 
how scholars have attempted to compare, analyze, and understand 
these cases in relation to their outcomes. Part II describes the 
methodology of rhetorical analysis. Part III uses rhetorical analysis 
to explore the personal narrative presented in Windsor. Part IV 
uses rhetorical analysis to explore the Court’s institutional 
narrative in Shelby County. This Article concludes with a 
comparative discussion of the two cases and highlights the 
similarities that have been largely overlooked.  
 
I. RECEPTION OF WINDSOR AND SHELBY COUNTY  
 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Windsor and Shelby County 
caused significant consternation among civil rights activists and 
legal scholars. This is unsurprising—a focus solely on the 
outcomes makes the rulings seem at odds.  
Scholars and practitioners generally view Windsor as a step 
forward in achieving marriage equality. For example, some 
scholars have described Windsor as “a landmark victory for gay 
rights”8 that “did much to advance the cause of same sex-marriage 
when it held that the United States should follow the lead of the 
various states in deciding on whether to accept same-sex 
marriage.”9 Another scholar described it as a “Supreme Court term 
[that brought] important progress on [the same-sex marriage] 
front.”10 
At the same time, many criticized Shelby County as a retreat in 
racial equality. One critic spoke of the decision: “relying on the 
myth of racial progress, the Supreme Court failed to confront the 
                                                
8 Inazu, supra note 3, at 521. 
9 Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: The Unfinished Business of the Supreme 
Court-an Introduction, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 137, 138–39 (2013) (citing 
William Baude, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage after Windsor, 8 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 150, 159 (2013)).  
10 Adam Lioz, Breaking the Vicious Cycle: How the Supreme Court Helped 
Create the Inequality Era and Why a New Jurisprudence Must Lead Us Out, 43 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1227, 1281 (2013). 
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racial balkanization in voting that exists.”11 Some scholars went so 
far to say it “marks the end of the civil rights era.”12 Reacting to 
the holding, Adam Lioz declared: “our generation must carry 
forward the torch of racial equality,” and hinted that Shelby County 
created room for more improvement in racial equality.13  
Many perplexed scholars focused on these inconsistent 
outcomes. Some asked how “[o]ne can celebrate the victories of 
gay people . . . while at the same time decrying the decisions’ 
limited vision of equality. That limited vision eroded the pursuit of 
equality in this term’s racial justice cases.”14 Various scholars 
focused on this inconsistency through multiple angles, but these 
analyses shared a commonality: they all focused on the outcomes. 
For example, many scholars approached the cases in the context of 
social movements.  For example, some noted that Windsor forms a 
parallel with the growing support of gay movements in society, 
while Shelby County is congruent with the recent discussion of a 
post-racial society. Some argued that while the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Windsor coincides with the growing support for gay 
rights,15 the “[e]xisting social realities belie the claim that the 
antidiscrimination norm has achieved unqualified success for 
African-Americans or that we have reached a ‘post’ racial 
society.”16 A similar analysis contrasts Windsor and the growing 
support for gay rights with Shelby County by stating, “one needs to 
look no further than the recent Shelby County v. Holder” decision 
to see some evidence to the contrary.17 Again, these analyses focus 
solely on outcomes—Windsor’s invalidation of the Defense of 
                                                
11 Ellis, supra note 7. 
12 Inazu, supra note 3, at 518 n.168.  
13 Lioz, supra note 10, at 1281 n.257.  
14 Hernandez, supra note 4 (“One can celebrate the victories for gay people 
while at the same time decrying this term’s sadly limited vision of justice for 
all.”).   
15 Inazu, supra note 3, at 519–20.  
16 Id. at 518.  See also, e.g., Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal 
Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 972 (2010); Inazu, supra note 3, at 517–20, 534 
n.168; Butler, supra note 6; Ellis, supra note 7.  
17 Jane S. Schacter, Unequal Inequalities? Poverty, Sexual Orientation, and 
the Dynamics of Constitutional Law, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 867, 881–82 (2014). 
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Marriage Act (“DOMA”), and Shelby County’s invalidation of the 
Voting Rights Act.  
This Article does not analyze the wisdom of this scholarship. 
Instead, it attempts to supplement this comparative exercise by 
shifting the focus from the cases’ outcomes to the processes by 
which they were decided. It examines how the Court narrated the 
points at issue and the choice of language in the opinions. It argues 
that a focus on how the cases were examined—rather than simply 
their holdings—reveals similarities that may not otherwise be 
apparent: most importantly, the persuasive narration of the concept 
of “rights.” 
 
II. METHODOLOGY: RHETORIC AS A MEANS OF PERSUASION 
  
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Windsor and Shelby County 
display two consistencies: first, the Court in both cases presents an 
extensive discourse of the concept of the “right” at issue, and 
second, the Court uses various rhetorical devices to convince the 
readers of its conceptualization of these rights, and thus, the 
outcomes of the cases. In so arguing, this Article conducts a 
rhetorical analysis of both Windsor and Shelby County.  
Rhetorical analysis “looks at how the law works by exploring a 
meaning-making process, one in which the law is ‘constituted’ as 
human beings located within particular historical and cultural 
communities write, read, argue about, and decide legal issues.”18 
Many scholars who conduct rhetorical analyses focus on how the 
Supreme Court uses rhetorical devices as a means of persuasion 
and these scholars define rhetoric as a “written discourse . . . [or] 
other [type] of symbolic communicative activity used to alter 
attitudes and mobilize action or to induce cooperation.”19 This 
definition of rhetoric is consistent with the Aristotelian tradition, 
which views rhetoric as “a faculty of considering all the possible 
means of persuasion on every subject.”20 
                                                
18 Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching “Law as Rhetoric:” A Place to 
Stand, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 5 (2010).  
19 Prentice, supra note 19, at 87 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).   
20 ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE’S TREATISE ON RHETORIC, BOOK 1, 11 (Theodore 
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According to Charles Miller, the Supreme Court has two major 
roles: “(1) to enunciate a political legal order through formal 
adjudication, and (2) to preserve the social-political bonds of the 
country.”21 To serve its second role, the Court must convince 
readers that its decisions are “reasonable, if not right.” 22 
Sometimes, however, logic is not enough to persuade readers: 
“[E]ven if people are unable to find any flaw in the logical chain 
leading from an agreed-upon premise to a desired conclusion, they 
can, and regularly do, simply choose to remain unpersuaded.”23 
Therefore, to persuade the reader, the Court has to persuasde 
“through the medium of ordinary language” in addition to its sound 
legal argument. 24  This medium of ordinary language includes 
rhetorical strategies like “emotional appeals, symbolism, audience 
adaptation, and other persuasive techniques . . . .”25 
The narrative structure of cases is important because “[l]aw is 
now widely recognized as one of those places where narrative 
finds a home.”26 Law does not exist in a vacuum. It forms an 
integral part of society, as “no set of legal institutions or 
prescriptions exist apart from the narratives that locate it and give 
it meaning.”27 Therefore, when we understand law within the 
context of narratives, “law becomes not merely a system of rules to 
be observed but a world in which we live.”28 In other words, a 
study of the Supreme Court’s narrative shows how the Court, 
through storytelling, attempts to build a bridge between its legal 
                                                
Buckley trans. London, Bohn 1857), available at 
https://books.google.com/books?id=PIIUAAAAcAAJ.  
21 CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF 
HISTORY 189 (1969).   
22 Austin Sarat, Rhetoric and Remembrance: Trials, Transcription, and the 
Politics of Critical Reading, 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 355, 371 (1999).  
23 Sherman J. Clark, The Character of Persuasion, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 
61, 64 (2003). 
24 ARISTOTLE, supra note 21, at 8.  
25 Prentice, supra note 19, at 89.  
26 Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 355 (1996).  
27 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term Forward:  Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983). 
28 Id. at 5.  
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arguments and the reader’s world. Since stories can “create 
emotional responses . . . narratives then[] appear to be uniquely 
suited to changing opinions and beliefs which are held 
emotionally, and which may be resistant to other forms of 
persuasion.”29 This Article, using narrative as a methodological 
tool, examines the stories presented in the two cases and how the 
facts and evidence are framed to contribute to the respective 
narratives. This analysis reveals coherency in the Supreme Court’s 
employment of the two frameworks and its narratives within them.  
 
III. THE PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF WINDSOR  
 
A. Introduction to Windsor  
 
United States. v. Windsor is a landmark decision in which the 
Supreme Court struck down DOMA. The plaintiff, Edith Windsor, 
was the surviving spouse of Thea Spyer.30 The two were married in 
Canada, where same-sex marriage was legal.31 New York, where 
the couple resided, did not allow same sex marriage at the time but 
recognized their Canadian marriage. 32  However, Windsor was 
denied the benefit of spousal deduction in federal estate taxes.33 
This denial was because the federal law, DOMA, did not recognize 
same-sex marriage under its definition of “marriage,” nor did it 
recognize a same-sex partner as a “spouse.”34 It defined “marriage” 
as “only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife,” and “spouse” as “only . . . a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”35 After Windsor paid 
taxes, she brought an action for a federal tax refund and to declare 
the relevant portion of DOMA as violative of the Fifth 
                                                
29 Philip J. Mazzocco & Melanie C. Green, Narrative Persuasion in Legal 
Settings: What’s the Story?, 23 JURY EXPERT 27, 28 (2011). 
30 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 2689.  
33 Id. at 2683.  
34 Id.  
35 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (DOMA § 3), held unconstitutional in Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675.   
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Amendment.36 The Department of Justice refused to defend the 
statute, but the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the 
House of Representatives intervened in the litigation to defend 
DOMA’s constitutionality.37 
The Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit 
ruled that the portion of DOMA that excluded same-sex partners 
from the definition of “spouse” was unconstitutional and ordered 
the United States to pay a refund to Windsor.38 The Supreme Court 
affirmed the Second Circuit.39 In its decision, the Court ruled that 
DOMA and its definitions of “marriage” and “spouse” violated the 
Fifth Amendment, as they denied homosexual couples the liberty 
and equal protection granted by the Due Process Clause,40 because 
Section 3 of the statute limited marriage to heterosexual couples.41  
 
B. Possibility of Alternate Framing  
 
Windsor is about both an individual and an institution. On the 
one hand, it is the story of Edith Windsor and her loving, same-sex 
marriage.42 On the other hand, it is about institutional power and 
the conflict between federal and state institutions and their ability 
to define marriage. 
The parties presented the Court with these alternative framings. 
The complaint filed in the Southern District centered on “Edie and 
                                                
36 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.  
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 2683–84.  
39 Id. at 2696.  
40 Id. at 2683. 
41 See id. (quoting § 3 of DOMA as having provided: “In determining the 
meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of 
the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word 
‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite 
sex who is a husband or a wife.”).  
42 See generally Complaint, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:10CV08435); see also Video: Edie and Thea (ACLU 
2013) (telling through interviews the love affair of Edie Windsor and Thea 
Spyer), available at https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/edie-windsor-and-aclu-
challenge-defense-marriage-act. 
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Thea’s life stories.”43 The facts section begins: “Edie and Thea’s 
life stories are in one sense remarkable for the extraordinary times 
through which they lived, and at the same time quite typical of the 
lives of gay men and lesbians of their generations . . . .”44 This 
rhetorical strategy to establish an empathetic personal character 
reaches its peak when the complaint states that “Edie and Thea 
went on to live lives of great joy, full of dancing, love, and 
celebration.”45 The facts section adds further depth regarding the 
couple’s lives. These sections provide seemingly extraneous but 
moving details, such as “Thea was fortunate enough to be able to 
flee Amsterdam with her stepmother at the outbreak of the Second 
World War, thereby escaping the Holocaust.”46 The complaint 
ultimately devotes four pages to Edie and Thea’s love story47 and 
only a single page to DOMA.48 
In Windsor’s motion for summary judgment, this personal 
narrative is also prevalent. The word “Edie” appears forty-three 
times, “Edith” three times, and “Windsor” seven times.49 The 
preliminary statement of this memorandum similarly starts with the 
story of Edie and Thea.50 The factual background in Windsor’s 
brief to the Supreme Court also begins with how Windsor and 
Spyer “fell in love and embarked upon a relationship that would 
last until Dr. Spyer’s death forty-four years later.”51 Their love 
story continues until page five of the brief.52 The word “Windsor” 
appears thirty-nine times.53 
                                                
43 See generally Complaint, supra note 43.  
44 Id. para. 13.  
45 Id.  
46 Id. para. 14.  
47 Id. paras. 20–51. 
48 See id. paras. 60–69.  
49 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 
1:10CV08435), 2011 WL 3165327. 
50 Id. at 1.  
51 Brief on the Merits for Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 1, United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Brief on the 
Merits for Respondent Windsor], 2013 WL 701228.  
52 Id. at 5. 
53 Id. passim. 
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In contrast, BLAG’s brief frames the issue with detachment 
and abstraction, and focuses on institutional process and power.54 
The  trial court brief begins by stating that “when people disagree 
in the legislative process, they often are required to listen to each 
other so as to be able to rebut arguments actually made by 
opponents and change enough minds to bring about legislative 
change.”55 It is not the story of Edie and Thea that introduces the 
case. Rather, the legislative process and its integrity begin the 
story.56 Further, BLAG’s brief refers to Windsor with impersonal 
nouns. The word “plaintiff” appears fifty-four times but “Edie” and 
“Windsor” only once each (in fact, “Edie Windsor” was the only 
time these two words appeared).57 
The treatment of DOMA also differs. Windsor’s Supreme 
Court brief starts by framing the Act’s personal implications: “this 
case raises questions whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage 
Act, which excludes legally married couples who are gay from the 
federal rights, benefits, and burdens that govern all other married 
couples, is constitutional.” 58  The implications of DOMA are 
immediately linked with “married couples who are gay.”59 On the 
other hand, the BLAG Supreme Court brief begins with DOMA 
and how “every state and the federal government define 
marriage.”60 Its discussion of DOMA starts with the issue of 
Congressional power and authority, not with DOMA’s 
implications for gay and lesbian couples: “DOMA reflected 
Congress’ determination that each sovereign should be able to 
determine for itself how to define marriage for purposes of its own 
law.”61 
                                                
54 See Reply Memorandum of Law for Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group at 
1, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y 2011) (No. 10-CV-
8435), 2011 WL 4428691.  
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 11.  
58 Brief on the Merits for Respondent Windsor, supra note 52, at 1.  
59 Id. 
60 Brief on the Merits for Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of 
the U.S. House of Representatives at 2, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013) (No. 12-307).  
61 Id. at 3–4.  
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As the court documents demonstrate, there were two possible 
alternatives for conceptualizing the case: one deploying rhetoric 
that emphasizes the Act’s consequences to people such as Edith 
Windsor, and another focusing more abstractly on DOMA and 
highlighting the legislative, sovereign powers of Congress. In the 
face of these alternatives, this Article argues that the Court in 
Windsor adopted a personal narrative that illuminated the strategic 
narration of an individual right. 
 
C. Rhetoric on Rights: Rights of Individuals   
 
Since Windsor posed a Fifth Amendment challenge to DOMA, 
most observers expected that the Court would at least engage in a 
discussion of individual rights, such as the right to due process and 
equality. The significant aspect of this case, and the subject of this 
Article, is how the Court conducts its discussion of individual 
rights.  
First, the Supreme Court created a protagonist, Edith Windsor, 
to reinforce its rhetoric on her individual right. Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion opens with a story of Windsor and her partner, 
Thea Spyer.62 “Two women then resident in New York were 
married in a lawful ceremony in Ontario, Canada, in 2007.”63 This 
opening introduces the protagonist, Windsor, and her partner. This 
immediately frames the case as a story of a personal character.64 
This sentence also immediately gives detailed information on 
Windsor. First, she was once a resident in New York, second, 
married in Ontario, third, she was married to another woman, and 
fourth, she married in 2007.65 Contrast this framing to that of the 
dissents. Chief Justice Roberts began his dissent with a 
jurisdictional question and placed a legal issue at the forefront.66 
Similarly, Justice Scalia started his dissent with the notion that 
“this case is about power in several respects,” and he framed the 
                                                
62 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
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case in relation to an abstract concept of power.67 The second 
sentence of Justice Kennedy’s opinion continues his personal 
narrative of the story of the two women: “Edith Windsor and Thea 
Spyer returned to their home in New York City.”68  
Throughout the opening paragraph, Justice Kennedy kept 
constant this narrative about the two women. The second sentence 
tells the reader her name and the name of her spouse.69 Other 
sentences in the first paragraph also begin with references to 
Windsor or Spyer: “Two women,” “Edith Windsor and Thea 
Spyer,” “Spyer,” “Windsor,” “She,” and “Windsor.” 70  Even 
DOMA, the federal statute in question, is introduced in the context 
of its implications for Edith Windsor—how this federal statute was 
barring her from claiming the estate tax exemption.71 Similarly, 
although the last two sentences of the first paragraph do not start 
with the main characters as the subjects, their discussion of the 
procedural posture of the case highlights the central narrative of 
the two women.72  
The procedural discussion of the case makes specific 
references to Windsor and how the case impacts her personally.73 
For instance, Justice Kennedy states, “the United States District 
Court and the Court of Appeals ruled that this portion of the statute 
is unconstitutional and ordered the United States to pay Windsor a 
refund.”74 An alternative statement could have been that the courts 
“ruled that this statute was unconstitutional and ordered a refund of 
the taxes paid.” Similarly, the last sentence of the first paragraph 
states, “this Court granted certiorari and now affirms the judgment 
in Windsor’s favor”—again bringing Windsor into the equation 
instead of simply stating “and now affirms.” 75  As a result, 
“Windsor,” “Spyer,” or “she” (referring to Windsor) appears in 
                                                
67 Id. at 2697–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
68 Id. at 2682 (majority opinion).  
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 2689.  
73 Id. at 2682–86, 2689.   
74 Id. at 2682 (emphasis added).  
75 Id. 
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every sentence in the opening paragraph, showing the Court’s 
conceptualization on a personal level. 76  Instead of impersonal 
pronouns like “appellee” or “respondent,” the opinion consistently 
refers to Windsor by name. In fact, “Windsor” appears 30 times in 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion.77 
This personal narrative allows the Court to engage in in-depth 
discussions of the facts and issues presented in connection with 
individual rights. The Court’s discussion of DOMA is an example. 
The Court repeatedly links the impact of the statute to a right of an 
individual, including the protagonist Windsor.78 It is true that the 
discussion of DOMA also includes an examination of the 
relationship between federal and state power.79 However, even in 
that discussion of government power, the Court touches upon the 
impact on the individual: “diminishing the stability and 
predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it 
proper to acknowledge and protect.”80 Thus, the issue of state and 
federal power is not only explored in the abstract but also 
discussed in the context of personal relations and the personal 
harm that DOMA causes. By delving into interpersonal 
relationships, the Court provides a thorough examination of how 
individuals are affected. In fact, the majority opinion states that the 
question presented is “one of immediate importance to the Federal 
Government and to hundreds of thousands of persons.”81  The 
opinion goes on to state that “DOMA instructs all federal officials, 
and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, 
including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than 
the marriages of others.” 82  Again, the harm to individuals is 
discussed extensively. This discussion goes beyond localized harm 
that the government causes to individuals. It also explores the 
indirect harm caused by other people’s perceptions and possible 
                                                
76 Id. 
77 Id. passim. 
78 Id. at 2682–89.  
79 Id. at 2694. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 2689 (emphasis added).  
82 Id. at 2696.  
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treatment of same-sex couples. Even if the reader is predisposed to 
focus on governmental power or DOMA’s content, this discussion 
on personal consequences allows the reader to refocus on the 
personal consequences to the individuals involved.  
This extensive rhetoric regarding individual rights is also 
apparent in the introduction of third parties. For example, to 
illuminate the harmful consequences of DOMA, Justice Kennedy 
discusses the rights of children: “DOMA also brings financial 
harm to children of same-sex couples.”83 He comprehensively 
describes DOMA’s harmful effects on children, thereby creating 
vivid imagery of their victimization.84 For example, the opinion 
states “it humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised 
by same-sex couples. The law in question makes it even more 
difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness 
of their own family . . . .” 85  In addition to financial harm to 
children, the word “humiliates” introduces another dimension of 
harm—the emotional consequences for children. This multi-
dimensional description of harm assists the reader in clearly 
identifying the victims—children of same-sex couples—and in 
vividly imagining their suffering.  
The Court’s use of children in its narrative goes into greater 
depth than Windsor’s brief. The brief refers to children mostly to 
discuss the connection between DOMA and procreation. 86  It 
discusses how the Act is unrelated to encouraging procreation and 
to “support for relationships that can result in mothers and fathers 
jointly raising their biological children.”87 Only one sentence—
“DOMA deprives children with married gay parents of tangible 
protections and stigmatizes their families by branding them 
unequal”88—alludes to children’s victimhood.  
 
 
                                                
83 Id. at 2695.   
84 Id. at 2694–95.   
85 Id. at 2694.  
86 Brief on the Merits for Respondent Windsor, supra note 52, at 40–47.   
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 46.  
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D. Persuasive Effect  
 
The Supreme Court, in its discussion of rights, employs many 
rhetorical techniques to convince the reader of its concept of an 
individual right and, therefore, its decision. First, having a 
protagonist drive the story of the opinion persuades the reader by 
rendering him sympathetic to the character and the character’s 
emotions. Vivid characters have often been tools for persuasion. 
Studies have shown that “narratives influence beliefs and attitudes 
in part by encouraging empathetic and emotional connections with 
story characters.”89 When a person reads a legal opinion, he comes 
with his own beliefs, rationales, and worldview. When the views of 
the opinion are inconsistent with those of the reader, the reader 
becomes resistant and may remain unconvinced even after 
understanding and acknowledging the soundness of the court’s 
reasoning. However, focusing on a character allows the reader to 
distance himself from his preconceived notions and to be 
transported to—and to become more invested in—the narrative of 
the story presented. The character of the story, in other words, 
invites and guides the reader into the world that the opinion 
presents.  
The theory of the transportation imagery model examines how 
the reader gets “immersed in the world of the story” 90  and 
distances himself from his own preexisting beliefs and opinions.91 
In order to study the transportation imagery model, Philip 
Mazzocco gave a short story of a homosexual to the participant 
readers.92 The story involved a protagonist and a teenager who 
recently came out as gay, in order “to produce tolerance and 
acceptance of homosexuals.”93 The results of the study indicated 
                                                
89 Mazzocco & Green, supra note 30, at 28.  
90 Id.  
91 Id. See generally RICHARD J. GERRIG, EXPERIENCING NARRATIVE 
WORLDS:  ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES OF READING (Yale Univ. Press 
1993) (explaining narrative transportation within the context of novels).   
92 Philip Mazzocco et al., This Story is Not for Everyone:  Transportability 
and Narrative Persuasion, 1 SOC. PSYCHOL. PERSONALITY SCI. 361, 362 (2010).  
Although this study was conducted to show individual differences in 
transportability, I limit my discussion to the general effect of transportability.  
93 Id. at 362.  
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that after reading the story, the persuasive narrative “influenced 
transportable recipients by increasing empathy for homosexuals.”94 
As the results show, the readers were affected by “cognitive 
responses, beliefs, and attitude and intention changes” of the 
narrative transportation.95 This is consistent with the idea that 
identifiable characters facilitate the “receiver’s identification with 
and potential empathy for the characters” because the readers 
“vicariously experience characters’ beliefs and emotions, 
empathize with them, and become engrossed in the story.”96  
This transportation contributes to the persuasiveness of the 
Court’s holding for two reasons. First, the reader may identify with 
the character and vicariously experience the pain that DOMA 
brings to Windsor and homosexual couples. This identification 
may facilitate acceptance of the Court’s holding that DOMA and 
its definition of marriage are unfair and unconstitutional, just as the 
identifiable character altered readers’ attitudes toward 
homosexuality in the Mazzocco study. Second, the discussion of 
the Act’s personal consequences may trigger an emotional 
response to how the characters in the opinion suffer from the 
denunciation of their marriage. Therefore, the reader may be more 
sympathetic to same-sex couples and Edith Windsor’s claims after 
conceptualizing DOMA as a medium of inflicting personal harm.  
Second, the Court’s delineation of what is at stake in relation to 
children also serves a persuasive function. Sympathy is important 
in persuasion. To understand emotions and “to name them and 
describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are 
excited” is one of “three means of effecting persuasion.”97 If the 
reader is sympathetic to people whom DOMA negatively affects, 
he will be more likely to agree with the Court’s decision to strike 
down the statute. The discussion of children is a great mechanism 
to arouse this sense of sympathy in readers.98 It creates vividly 
                                                
94 Mazzocco & Green, supra note 30, at 31.  
95 Tom van Laer et al., The Extended Transportation-Imagery Model:  A 
Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Consequences of Consumers’ Narrative 
Transportation, 40 J. CONSUMER RES. 797, 800 (2014). 
96 Id. at 802.   
97 ARISTOTLE, supra note 21, pt. III. 
98 George Loewenstein & Deborah A. Small, The Scarecrow and the Tin 
Man: The Vicissitudes of Human Sympathy and Caring, 11 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 
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identifiable victims—a “determinant of sympathy”—because 
“sympathy, like other emotions, is highly attuned to visual 
imagery, and the more vivid that imagery is, the more likely one is 
to sympathize.”99 “[P]ortrayals of needy individuals who have 
suffered misfortune for reasons beyond their control” is a prime 
example of describing identifiable victims associated with 
“sympathetic information.”100 Similarly, researchers have found 
that “moral emotions,” including sympathy, are “highly 
intercorrelated and strongly related to perceived vulnerability.”101 
Children—toddlers in particular—are the category of people who 
are ranked highest on the vulnerability scale.102 
Third, the Court in its narration of individual rights explores 
the love story as a genre. Throughout the opinion, the love story 
between Windsor and Spyer is developed extensively to fit the 
“universal” factors of love to which the reader can relate.103 
Highlighting the universal features of love in Edith Windsor’s 
relationship makes it easier for the reader to recognize that 
Windsor and Spyer loved each other just as a heterosexual couple 
loves each other. This emphasis on the universal nature of love is 
particularly important because many fictional narratives on love 
have described love as “timeless and natural” and part of “human 
nature.”104 
The idea of commitment is important because of the notion that 
love is about “emotional commitment, empathy, and exclusivity so 
strong that lovers are … prepared to . . . continue their relationship 
                                                
112, 118 (2007) (discussing the plight of 18-month-old “Baby Jessica”).  
99 Id.  
100 Id.  
101 Anton J. M. Dijker, Perceived Vulnerability as a Common Basis of 
Moral Emotions, 49 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 415, 415 (2010).  
102 Id. at 420.   
103 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683–84 (2013). 
104 DAVID R. SHUMWAY, MODERN LOVE:  ROMANCE, INTIMACY, AND THE 
MARRIAGE CRISIS 2 (2003); see also Anne E. Beall & Robert J. Sternberg, The 
Social Construction of Love, 12 J. SOC. PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 417, 423 (1995) 
(describing the triangular theory of love). The theory states that love includes 
three components: passion, intimacy, and decision/commitment. Robert J. 
Sternberg, A Triangular Theory of Love, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 119 (1986).  
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beyond death.”105 The Court’s description of the love between 
Windsor and Spyer resonates with this universal description of 
love based on emotional commitment. For instance, the Court 
highlights how they were involved in a “long term relationship,”106 
highlighting the lasting element of their commitment. The intensity 
of emotional dedication to one another is underscored by the 
Court’s description of how Spyer “left her entire estate to 
Windsor,” 107  and their continued efforts to affirm their 
commitment through marriage. First, they tried “waiting some 
years” for the legalization of gay marriage,108 but when “citizens 
had not even considered the possibility that two persons of the 
same sex might aspire to occupy the same status and dignity as that 
of a man and woman in lawful marriage,” they traveled to Ontario 
to get married.109 This framing of Windsor’s love as the love that 
all readers experience was evident when the Court stated that they 
“affirm[ed] their commitment to one another before their children, 
their family, their friends, and their community.”110 The repetition 
of “their children, their family, their friends, and their community” 
places same-sex couples in the same position as any other 
individuals with their own family members, loved ones, and 
communities. The readers, therefore, can identify with the love and 
desire for commitment. Like heterosexual couples, Windsor and 
Spyer and other same-sex couples love each other and want to 
show it through commitment. 
In addition, emphasizing Windsor’s love makes it easier for the 
reader to accept the holding because love is frequently associated 
with marriage. While in the past love and marriage were not 
necessarily correlated, the notion of romantic marriage has gained 
great prominence in modern society.111 For instance “[i]n Western 
cultures, love is important because it is strongly associated with 
                                                
105 Johnathan Gottschall & Marcus Nordlund, Romantic Love: A Literary 
Universal?, 30 PHIL. & LITERATURE 432, 443 (2006).  
106 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.  
107 Id. at 2682–83.  
108 Id. at 2689.   
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 SHUMWAY, supra note 105.  
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marriage” 112  and people frequently view love as an essential 
component of marriage or marriage as a result of love.113 As a 
consequence, the connection between love and marriage114 seems 
natural to the reader. The reader relates Windsor’s and Speyer’s 
love to his or her own and thus is more likely to accept the Court’s 
decision. 
Further, Windsor’s love story is tragic. Death dramatized the 
love between Windsor and Spyer. The journey to their marriage 
began because they were “concerned about Spyer’s health.”115 
Even when one partner had fallen ill and was suffering, the couple 
still “longed to marry,”116 and Windsor stood by Spyer’s side until 
Spyer’s death.117 This death invokes the genre of the tragic love 
story. Tragedy has historically been a source of emotional 
involvement for the reader. From Homer’s Iliad to Sophocles’ 
King Oedipus, readers become personally involved in “narratives” 
that “help members of an audience understand the problematic in 
social life and integrate understandings with existing models of 
self and other.”118 This theme is common in tragedy—that of 
humans living “in a world in which they choose many of their own 
actions,” where “their mental models are usually imperfect and 
invariably incomplete” and where “their agency is limited by the 
constraints of embodiment.”119 Windsor’s and Spyer’s suffering 
due to an event beyond their control triggers the same sort of 
“personal involvement” that the classic tragedies bring to the 
reader and make him “once again moved” with “tears in [his] 
                                                
112 Beall & Sternberg, supra note 105, at 426.  
113 Jeffry A. Simpson et al., The Association between Romantic Love and 
Marriage: Kephart (1967) Twice Revisited, 12 PERS. SOC. & PSYCHOL. BULL. 
363 (1986).  
114 Although Shumway talks about the importance of emerging rhetoric on 
“intimacy,” this discussion is beyond the scope of this article. See SHUMWAY, 
supra note 105.  
115 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.  
116 Id. at 2689.  
117 Id. at 2683.  
118 Keith Oatley, Why Fiction May be Twice as True as Fact:  Fiction as 
Cognitive and Emotional Simulation, 3 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 101, 110 (1999).  
119 Id.  
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eyes.” 120  Furthermore, the intensity of personal involvement 
through emotional experience is critical to persuasion because 
these sorts of emotions “signal situations that are personally 
important” to readers and beyond their rational understanding.121 
Readers—triggered by memories, emotions, and reactions—invest 
a part of themselves in the tragic love story between Windsor and 
Spyer. Exploring the love story as a genre enables not only a 
discussion of the legal issue presented in relation to individual 
right—the right to marry—but also makes the discussion more 
convincing.   
 
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL NARRATIVE OF SHELBY COUNTY 
 
In the previous section, this Article discussed how the Supreme 
Court conducted an extensive discourse on an individual right in 
Windsor and the way in which the Court advanced the rights of 
same-sex couples. As also discussed, commentators have criticized 
Shelby County as retreat in racial equality. This Article does not 
dispute the notion that Shelby County invalidated a crucial portion 
of the Voting Rights Act—an action that can be described as 
adversarial to an individual right. Nevertheless, a close 
examination of the opinion’s language reveals a heavy discussion 
and framing based on the notion of a right, just as in Windsor, 
albeit on a different level. The Court engaged in a persuasive 
narration of an individual right in Windsor, and a persuasive 
narration of an institutional right in Shelby County.  
 
A. Introduction to Shelby County v. Holder  
   
In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court held that 
Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional because 
current political conditions rendered its coverage formula 
obsolete.122 Shelby County sought a declaratory judgment that 
Sections 4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act were facially 
                                                
120 Id. at 111. 
121 Id. at 112.  
122 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
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unconstitutional.123 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
enacted to address racial discrimination in voting, required States 
to “obtain federal permission before enacting any law related to 
voting”124 and Section 4 of the Act applied that requirement “only 
to some States” covered by the formula it provided.125 While the 
Supreme Court did not speak to Section 5, the Court declared that 
Section 4 of the Act was no longer constitutional.126 
 
B. Possibility of Alternate Framing  
 
Similar to Windsor, Shelby County could have also been 
framed in the context of a personal or institutional narrative. On 
the one hand, the story was institutional because a county, and not 
an individual, brought the suit. On the other hand, the case 
complicates the individual rights of minority voters and their 
struggles for equal voting rights.  
The parties presented the Court with these alternative framings. 
Shelby County focused its brief on an institutional narrative.127 In 
the introduction to its petition for certiorari, Shelby County began 
with the notion of state power: “Article IV and the Tenth 
Amendment reserve to the States the power to regulate 
elections.”128 The beginning of the petition describes the main 
character of the story—the state—and the theme of state power. 
Also, when discussing the contemporary evidence of 
discrimination, the County presented evidence on an abstract level 
—for example, its discussion of the objection rate,129 voter turnout 
and registration rates,130 a state-by-state comparison of Section 2 
litigation data,131 and “instances of racially polarized voting.”132 
                                                
123 Id. at 2621–22. 
124 Id. at 2618. 
125 Id.  
126 Id. at 2631.  
127 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 
2612 (2013) (No. 12-96); Brief For Petitioner, Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 
S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96). 
128 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 128, at 1. 
129 Brief For Petitioner, supra note 128, at 29.  
130 Id. at 44. 
131 Id. at 46–49. 
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In contrast, there are also examples of personal narratives. The 
respondent-intervenors Bobby Pierson et al. began Section A of 
their petition with, “[a]fter ‘enduring nearly a century of systematic 
resistance to the Fifth Amendment,’ Congress enacted the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, [Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965)], ‘to 
banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has 
infected the electoral process in parts of our country.’”133 Then the 
second sentence immediately frames on an individual level what is 
at stake by stating that “[f]or nearly fifty years, the Voting Rights 
Act has played a pivotal role in helping to preserve the right to 
vote for all Americans.” 134  Also, the brief for the federal 
respondent to the Supreme Court uses a personal narrative to 
present evidence of current discrimination. It introduces the 
individual “voter” as the subject.135 It then discusses how the 
States “discriminated against African-American voters” 136  and 
“resist[ed] minority voters’ equal enjoyment of the right to 
participate in the political process.”137 The amicus brief for the 
New York Law School Racial Justice Project states that the Voting 
Rights Act’s success “was a turning point in ‘the struggle to end 
discriminatory treatment of minorities who seek to exercise one of 
the most fundamental rights of our citizens: the right to vote.’”138 
The discussions focused on rights at an individual level, articulated 
the implications of Section 4 for African Americans, and situated 
the Act in relation to the history of intentional discrimination 
against African American voters. The Court, likewise, could have 
                                                
132 Id. at 48.  
133 Brief for Respondent-Intervenors Bobby Pierson, Willie Goldsmith, Sr., 
Mary Paxton-Lee, Kenneth Dukes, and Alabama State Conference of the 
NAACP at 1, Shelby Cnty., Ala v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96).  
134 Id.  
135 Brief for the Federal Respondent at 30–34, Shelby County, Ala v. 
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96).  
136 Id. at 38.  
137 Id. at 20.  
138 Brief for the New York Law School Racial Justice Project as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellee and Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee at 
4, Shelby County, Ala v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96) 
[hereinafter Brief for NYLS Racial Justice Project], 2011 WL 6098776 (citing 
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009)). 
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explained that voters of some states are granted a different level of 
protection than voters of other states because those states have to 
receive preclearance from the federal government. To further 
illustrate the difference between a personal and an institutional 
narrative, an alternative opening to the opinion could have 
discussed examples of “extraordinary problems,” such as African 
Americans being unable to vote because they were blocked at the 
ballots. This alternative narrative focusing on minority voters and 
their struggle to gain their constitutionally guaranteed right to vote 
would have triggered sympathy toward them. They are identifiable 
victims who are suffering because of invidious discriminatory 
policies that state actors have undertaken to suppress their voting 
strength. Highlighting this story of personal struggle would also 
have facilitated transportation of the reader into the story of the 
struggling voters.  
The Court could have framed the narrative in different ways. It 
could have created an institutional narrative that focused on state 
and national data, or a personal narrative that focused on minority 
voters and their struggles. The following sections demonstrate that 
the Court chose an institutional narrative in a strategic way to 
increase persuasiveness of the outcome of Shelby County. While a 
personal narrative, as the Court used in Windsor, focuses on 
triggering an emotional or psychological reaction to the personal 
character and Windsor’s  story, an institutional narrative detaches 
personal emotion or connection, and redirects the focus to the 
institution (in this case, the state) and its traditions and principles. 
But, similar to Windsor, the Court in Shelby County—with the unit 
as a state—employs persuasive rhetoric based on the concept of a 
right.  
 
C. Rhetoric on Right: State Right  
 
Just as Windsor framed a protagonist in its story, Shelby 
County creates a protagonist of the “state” to begin its discussion 
of the right at issue. The majority opinion begins by stating that 
“[t]he Voting Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary 
measures to address an extraordinary problem”139 and focuses on 
                                                
139 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013).  
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the statute. The Court, when discussing the implications of Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act in relation to the states, notes that 
“Section 5 of the Act required States to obtain federal permission 
before enacting any law related to voting—a drastic departure from 
basic principles of federalism.”140 The Court further recognized 
that “§ 4 of the Act applied that requirement only to some 
States . . . .” 141  Throughout the opinion, the words “state” and 
“states” appear sixty-nine times, while the words “voter” and 
“voters” appear twenty-eight times (only when used as nouns or 
adjectives).142 
With the “state” as the protagonist, the Court engages in the 
discussion of the right, similar to its engagement in the discussion 
of right with Edith Windsor as the protagonist in Windsor. The 
Supreme Court engages in a discussion of institutional rights, 
namely, the right to maintain its sovereignty under federalism, just 
as a person has a right to maintain his autonomy as a person. The 
majority opinion starts with the introduction of “basic principles of 
federalism” 143  and returns to this idea of a “fundamental 
principle” 144  of federalism throughout the opinion. Then, it 
references these “basic features of our system of government” 
when discussing how the Voting Rights Act is a drastic departure 
from this institutional feature.145 In fact, the features of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 are repeatedly characterized as “extraordinary 
measures” or “drastic departures.” 146  Chief Justice Roberts’ 
majority opinion describes the Act as “strong medicine,”147 and 
recounts the “exceptional conditions” 148  that led to the 
“unprecedented nature of these measures,” 149  which “sharply 
                                                
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. passim. 
143 Id. at 2618.  
144 Id. at 2622 (quoting Northwest Austin v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 
(2009)).  
145 Id. at 2624.  
146 Id. at 2618.  
147 Id.  
148 Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966)).  
149 Id.  
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departed” 150  from the basic principles of federalism. 151  The 
emphasis on the “extraordinary” and “drastic” nature of the Voting 
Rights Act in conjunction with the description of an “institutional 
feature” that is “fundamental” highlights the Voting Rights Act 
pre-clearance requirement as an exception to the norms of 
federalism. Phrases such as “substantial federalism costs”152 and 
“extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our federal 
system”153 are additional examples of how the Court underscores 
the principle of federalism and the maintenance of institutional 
integrity. The Court’s statement that “[s]tates retain broad 
autonomy in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative 
objectives”154 is another example of an emphasis on sovereignty 
under the principle of federalism.  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court engages in rhetoric of 
institutional rights based on equality among the states. The 
majority opinion declares that the nation was founded as a “union 
of States, equal in power, dignity, and authority.”155 However, 
according to the Court, §4 of the Act violated the fundamental 
rights of the states in an extraordinary way.156 Just as Windsor 
highlighted a violation of a right in relation to DOMA, the Court 
discusses the Voting Rights Act in relation to a violation of a state 
right: “While one State waits months or years and expends funds to 
implement a validly enacted law, its neighbor can typically put the 
same law into effect immediately, through the normal legislative 
process.”157 The Court even frames the question in relation to a 
                                                
150 Id. at 2624. 
151 Also note the Court’s use of amplifying terms such as “exceptional 
conditions,” “uncommon exercise,” “exceptional condition,” “extraordinary 
legislation,” id. at 2623, “far cry from the initial five year period,” id. at 2626, 
“extraordinary legislation,” id. at 2628, and “far from ordinary,” id. at 2630.  
Although this continued reference to “extraordinary” nature of the Act is partly 
due to the legal standard, this repetition of similar phrases also has rhetorical 
significance.  
152 Id. at 2627–28.  
153 Id. at 2628.  
154 Id. at 2623.  
155 Id. (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911)).  
156 Id.   
157 Id. at 2624.  
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state’s right to equal treatment, saying that “[t]he question is 
whether the Act’s extraordinary measures, including its disparate 
treatment of the States, continue to satisfy constitutional 
requirements.”158 The discussion of equality continues as the Court 
recognizes that a “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty 
requires showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is 
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets. These basic 
principles guide our review of the question before us.”159 The 
Court repeatedly refers to equal sovereignty among the states as a 
“fundamental principle,” highlighting its rhetoric on the federalist 
institutional structure and its core implications on a state’s right to 
sovereignty.160 It further states “Over a hundred years ago, this 
Court explained that our Nation ‘was and is a union of States, 
equal in power, dignity and authority.’”161 The phrase, “[o]ver a 
hundred years ago,” is used to assert that this principle of equal 
sovereignty among the states has been elaborated for a long period. 
The opinion also makes a reference to the “tradition of equal 
sovereignty,”162 strengthening its position by highlighting states’ 
long-standing right to sovereignty.  
 
D. Persuasive Effect  
 
As in Windsor, the Court’s rhetoric on rights gains 
persuasiveness through various rhetorical devices. First, as 
discussed above, the Court aligns attachment and transportation 
from voters to the character of the state.  
Second, the Court’s reference to federalism enhances the 
legitimacy of its decision. Scholars such as Robert Hume have 
observed the Court’s use of esteemed rhetorical sources to enhance 
its persuasiveness.163 Hume stated that “when deciding hard cases, 
justices must know that their opinions are likely to be scrutinized 
                                                
158 Id. at 2617.  
159 Id. at 2622 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
160 Id. at 2623. 
161 Id.    
162 Id. at 2624.  
163 See Hume, supra note 19. 
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by individuals both on and off the bench.”164 Hume further argues 
that the Court’s usage of esteemed sources like the Federalist 
Papers enhances the “legitimacy of [its] decisions” because the 
Justices can associate their rulings with the legitimacy of the 
sources that they cite.165 The Justices can enhance their legitimacy 
through the “use of persuasive opinion content, including 
rhetorical sources” and by “associating their rulings with the views 
of well-respected authorities.”166 Hume has found that the “Justices 
do indeed cite rhetorical sources with greater frequency when the 
legitimacy of their decisions is lowest.”167 
Just as the Justices can enhance the legitimacy of their 
decisions through the use of esteemed sources, they can improve 
their persuasiveness by associating their decisions with other 
factors that enhance legitimacy, such as tradition. Max Weber has 
argued that there are three sets of authority: legal authority, 
traditional authority, and charismatic authority.168 In discussing the 
traditional authority of federalism, Weber acknowledges the 
possibility of history establishing legitimacy, “if legitimacy is 
claimed for it and believed in on the basis of the sanctity of the 
order and the attendant powers of control as they have been handed 
down from the past, ‘have always existed.’”169 Just as a person, 
such as a monarch, can gain legitimacy and authority through the 
notion of tradition, an institutional principle, such as federalism, 
can gain legitimacy through its durability. 170  This method is 
especially efficient because federalism is one of the most important 
institutional structures of the United States,171 and the idea of each 
                                                
164 Id. at 818.  
165 Id.  
166 Id. at 821.  
167 Id. at 831.  
168 MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 
341 (Simon & Schuster 2009). 
169 Id.  
170 Id.  
171 Federalism is described as “one of the most important and innovative 
concepts in the US constitution.” Federalism, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/tpt/ 
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state enjoying its sovereignty under the umbrella of the federal 
government is one of the unique features of the country’s 
institutional structure.172 
This emphasis on the principle of federalism is consistent with 
the Shelby County’s Supreme Court brief. The brief uses language 
such as “federalism burden,” 173  “federalism costs,” 174  “severe 
federalism problems,” 175  the “fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty,” 176  and the “constitutional principle of equal 
sovereignty.” 177  On the other hand, the brief for the federal 
respondent does not contain any mention of federalism and 
discusses state sovereignty only once, when it states that it is not 
an invasion of state sovereignty when Congress is legitimately 
enforcing restrictions.178 Instead, the brief emphasizes fundamental 
rights such as the right to equal treatment and the right to vote.179 
Briefs for the respondent-intervenors Earl Cunningham et al. also 
mention the idea of “federalism costs” only twice180 and discuss 
                                                
describing the institutional structure of the United States. Federalism also is a 
key ingredient in Our Nationalism. The modern federal regulatory apparatus is 
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instead the “right to vote on account of race,”181 the exercise of the 
right to vote,182  and the “fundamental . . . right to vote.”183 
Ignoring the federalism arguments supports the position that 
federalism is inessential to the Court’s decision. The Court, 
however, uses federalism as a rhetorical tool to strategically frame 
the case. And just as the plaintiff highlighted the principle of 
federalism to persuade the Court, the Court invokes this federalist 
principle to enhance the opinion’s legitimacy.  
Third, the Court discusses data in a persuasive way in its 
narration of the impact on states. This is especially so when it 
acknowledges racial discrimination in the past and contrasts it with 
current state-level empirical data to support its position. 
Concession is a rhetorical device that enhances the legitimacy and 
persuasiveness of the speaker by establishing him as a good 
character. Imagine two people. One is denying a set of facts that is 
clearly established by evidence, and blindly refuting a common 
history that almost every reader agrees has happened. Another 
admits to commonly agreed-upon facts presented by the other side. 
As an example of concession, Aristotle states “the litigant will 
sometimes not deny that a thing has happened or that he has done 
harm. But that he is guilty of injustice he will never admit” and 
“political orators often make any concession short of admitting that 
they are recommending their hearers to take an inexpedient course 
or not to take an expedient one.”184 This usage of concession is an 
effective means of persuasion because the speakers “have at their 
command propositions about the possible and the impossible, and 
about whether a thing has or has not occurred, will or will not 
occur.”185 Aristotle states that there are three modes of persuasion: 
the “personal character of the speaker,” “putting the audience into 
a certain frame of mind,” and “proof, or apparent proof, provided 
by the words of the speech itself.”186 Conceding an issue may 
signal to the reader that the speaker is a rational, reasonable, and 
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open-minded person, and is thus credible. Strategic concession, 
therefore, may improve the persuasiveness of the speaker by 
signaling to the audience that the speaker is of a good personal 
character.187 
When discussing past discrimination, the Court—breaking 
from its practice in other parts of the opinion—employs a personal 
narrative that is similar to the defendants’ narrative framework. 
Since the Court’s opinion displays this shift in the narrative toward 
that of the losing side, this Article refers to the Court’s recognition 
and discussion of past discrimination as a form of concession.  
The majority opinion switches its narrative from personal to 
institutional when discussing evidence of past discrimination and 
current discrimination for the purposes of evaluating the validity of 
the Section 4 formula.188 The Court, like the federal respondent, 
uses personal narrative when describing evidence of past 
discrimination.189 In the beginning of Section IA, the opinion gives 
historical evidence of racial discrimination in voting.190 When 
discussing the past, the Court introduces a personal character, 
namely, an African American voter, with phrases like “other 
methods designed to prevent African-Americans from voting.”191 
Also, in describing past discrimination, the Court states, “only 19.4 
percent of African-Americans of voting age were registered to vote 
in Alabama, only 31.8 percent in Louisiana, and only 6.4 percent 
in Mississippi.” 192  This narrative acknowledges and highlights 
personal harm to “African-Americans.” Even when discussing 
more abstract evidence, such as voting rights, in the historical 
context, the Court provides a link to this personal character: “a low 
voting rate is pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread 
disenfranchisement must inevitably affect the number of actual 
voters.”193 Further, the Court states how past racial discrimination 
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“denied African-Americans the most basic freedoms,” which 
establishes a narrative based on African Americans, as people, 
being denied the freedom to vote.194 
A case like Shelby County presents multiple issues. Most 
people agree that there has been serious historical racial 
discrimination in voting rights and that legislation like the Voting 
Rights Act was necessary to redress for minority voters that 
violation of equal protection. The Court therefore wisely 
acknowledged that there had been racial discrimination in the past 
that made the implementation of the Voting Rights Act imperative. 
By using a personal narrative similar to that used by Shelby County 
and discussing the evidence of past racial discrimination in a 
sympathetic light, the Court conceded the past justification for the 
enactment of the Voting Rights Act, including Section 4. 
Expressing its agreement allows the Court to signal to the reader 
that it is reasonably accepting the position of the party it ruled 
against. Therefore, the Court can be seen as a reasonable, fair, and 
unbiased arbiter. By accepting the necessity of the Voting Rights 
Act in the past and the grave personal consequences of 
discrimination against minority voters, the Court was able to ease 
the reader into its discussion of the current conditions and the 
invalidity of Section 4 of the Act.  
When the Court discusses recent evidence, however, the 
framing shifts to again detach the emotional aspect associated with 
a personal narrative and instead focuses on state-level data. The 
Court points out that African Americans occupy a greater portion 
of political offices than in the past,195 and primarily frames the 
evidence on a state level, discussing “voter turnout and registration 
rates,” and “blatant discriminatory evasions of federal decrees.”196 
Again, an alternative would have been to present African 
American voters on a personal level, thus paralleling sentence 
structure with the discussion of past discrimination. Similarly, 
although the Court references the House Report that discusses the 
consequences for individuals, such as “the number of African-
Americans who are registered and who turn out to cast ballots has 
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increased significantly over the last 40 years, particularly since 
1982” or “significant increases in the number of African-
Americans serving in elected offices,”197 it does so by referring to 
data on a state level, using phrases like “voter turnout.”198 In fact, 
the Court does not address the number of white and African 
American voters from the Census Bureau statistics but jumps 
straight to an analysis of the rates and statistics on “disparities in 
voter registration and turnout due to race.”199 
This is in contrast to the New York Law School Racial Justice 
Project amicus brief, which puts minority voters at the center of the 
discussion and states that “minority citizens are still denied access 
to the ballot and have had to struggle through increasingly 
ingenious discriminatory roadblocks.”200 The amicus brief also 
includes specific personal examples, including how David Dinkins, 
an African American, encountered “blatant attempts of 
intimidation” during his reelection campaign for mayor of New 
York.201 As this alternative approach shows, the Court, if it wanted 
to continue its personal narrative, could have pointed to a story 
about an African American voter no longer facing challenges in 
registering to vote in Shelby County.  
As demonstrated above, the Court, as in Windsor, engaged in 
strategic narration of the right in Shelby County to further its 





An examination of the Supreme Court’s rhetorical framings 
helps the reader to understand the otherwise contradictory opinions 
of Windsor and Shelby County. These landmark decisions have 
spurred criticism of the Court’s inconsistent treatment of equality. 
This Article supplements the comparative study of the two cases 
by analyzing another dimension: their narrations. The rhetorical 
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analysis of the two cases shows that the Court approached Windsor 
using a personal narrative and Shelby County using an institutional 
narrative. This rhetorical analysis, focusing on how the cases were 
decided, reveals that the Court’s decisions may be more 
harmonious than critics have acknowledged. It suggests that the 
Court conceptualized both cases in relation to the concept of  
“rights,” albeit rights on different levels. Also, the Court in both 
cases engaged in strategic narration regarding its selected concepts 
of rights and employed various rhetorical devices to make its 
decisions more persuasive. This dimension, which focuses on the 
Court’s rhetoric as opposed to mere outcomes, may be a new 
medium for understanding this critical time for equality.  
